Abstract. A prohibitive barrier faced by elliptic curve users is the difficulty of computing the curves' cardinalities. Despite recent theoretical breakthroughs, point counting still remains very cumbersome and intensively time consuming. In this paper we show that point counting can be avoided at the cost of a protocol slow-down. This slow-down factor is quite important (typically ∼ = 500) but proves that the existence of secure elliptic-curve signatures is not necessarily conditioned by point counting.
Introduction
Point counting is the most complex part of elliptic-curve cryptography which, despite constant improvements, still remains time-consuming and cumbersome (we refer the reader to [3, 4, 8, 9, 13-15, 11, 17, 20, 21] for a comprehensive bibliography about cardinality counting).
Elliptic-curve cryptosystems that would not require point counting are thus theoretically interesting, although, having taken the decision to design such a scheme, one must overcome three technical difficulties:
-If the number of points on the curve (#C) is unknown to the participants, the protocol must never involve q, the large prime factor of #C. This excludes the computation of modular inverses modulo q by the signer and the verifier (recall that DSA signatures involve s = (m + xr)/k mod q and verifications require 1/s mod q).
-Being unknown, #C may be accidentally smooth enough to be vulnerable to Pohlig-Hellman attack [18] . An attacker could then undertake the point counting avoided by the designer, factor #C and break-down the Discrete Logarithm Problem's complexity into the much easier tasks of solving DLPs in the various subgroups that correspond to the factors of #C. -Finally, even if #C has a large prime factor q, the choice of the group generator G (e.g. ECDSA's exponentiation base) may still yield a small subgroup vulnerable to discrete logarithm extraction.
Sections 2, 3 and 4 will develop separately each of these issues which will be assembled as a consistent, point-counting-free cryptosystem in section 5. By easing considerably key-generation, our protocol will extend the key-range of elliptic-curve cryptosystems and open new research perspectives.
2 Poupard-Stern's q-free DSA In Eurocrypt'98, Poupard and Stern [19] presented a DSA-like scheme that combines DLP-based provable security, short identity-based keys, very low transmission overhead and minimal on-line computations. By opposition to other Schnorr-like schemes, Poupard-Stern's protocol uses the order of the multiplicative group q only for system setup (figure 1).
System parameters
primes p and q such that We refer the reader to [19] for a precise definition of the system parameters (e.g. the size of k), a formal security proof and a description of the scheme's implementation trade-offs.
Elliptic-curve generalization is straightforward: let p be the size of the underlying field (or ring) on which the curve is defined (a prime, an RSA modulus or 2 n ); when p is a prime or an RSA modulus the equation of the curve C, characterized by a and b, is given by y 2 = x 3 + ax + b; the curve will be defined by y 2 + xy = x 3 + ax + b when the underlying field is GF(2 n ). In the elliptic curve Pourpard-Stern signature scheme, p − 1 and q are respectively replaced by #C and one of its large prime factors (figure 2).
a prime q an elliptic curve C such that q|#C G ∈ C of order q a hash function h : {0, Poupard and Stern's security proof can be extended, mutatis mutandis, to the elliptic-curve variant; the proof can be consulted in the appendix.
We will now suppress from the above protocol the last references to q; care should be taken to underline that we do not claim yet that the resulting protocol ( figure 3 ) is secure.
The Expected Smoothness of #C
As an inescapable consequence of our modification, #C may now be smooth enough to be at Pohlig-Hellman's reach. An attacker could then perform the point counting, factor #C and reduce the DLP's complexity into the much easier tasks of solving DLPs in the various subgroups that correspond to the different factors of #C. Moreover, even if #C has a large prime factor it may still be divisible by a product π of small primes, allowing the adversary to find a portion of the secret key (x mod π) using Pohlig-Hellman. Using Hasse's theorem, we set System parameters a random elliptic curve
L = log 2 p + 1 − 2 √ p and deliberately accept that only bits of the L-bit secret key will actually remain unknown to the attacker.
We consider that a curve is weak if all the factors of #C are smaller than 2 (i.e. #C is 2 -smooth) where is a security parameter. The odds of such an event are analyzed in this section under the assumption that #C is uniformly distributed over
. Defining ψ(x, y) = #{n < x, such that n is y-smooth}, it is known [5] [6] [7] that, for large x, the ratio:
x) x is equivalent to Dickman's function defined by:
is thus an approximation of the probability that a × t-bit number is 2 -smooth; table 1 summarizes the value of ρ for 2 ≤ t ≤ 10.
Since ρ(t) is not easy to compute, we will use throughout this paper the exact formula for t ≤ 10 and de Bruijn's asymptotic approximation [1, 2] for t > 10:
where ζ is the positive solution of e ζ − 1 = tζ and γ is Euler's constant. Table 1 shows that the proportion of weak curves is too high for immediate use: values of t, such as 2 and 3, which would respectively yield 320 and 480-bit field size for = 160, correspond to a percentage of 0.3 and 0.05 weak curves. In section 5, we will propose a signature strategy that decreases exponentially these probabilities.
As pointed out earlier, the above assumes that #C is distributed uniformly
. A more accurate result, valid for prime p, was proved by Lenstra in [12] : Theorem 1. Denoting by #' the number of isomorphism classes of elliptic curves, and ∆(S) = # {elliptic curves E over F p such that #E ∈ S ⊂ IN} there exist effectively computable positive constants c 1 , c 2 such that for each prime p > 3, the following holds:
• if for all s ∈ S, |s
Since all classes have a number of representatives which is roughly p, Lenstra's theorem basically claims that by taking a curve at random, the probability τ S that its cardinality lies in S satisfies the inequality:
where π S denotes the probability of picking an element of S at random in the interval p − √ p, p + √ p . The theorem indicates that (at least if p is prime) when C is random, the proportion of weak-curves respects Dickman's estimate. We consider this as heuristically satisfactory for further build-up. 4 The Expected Order of the Generator G Even when #C has an prime factor larger than bits, G could still yield a small subgroup, which would again weaken the scheme.
We refer the reader to [16] for the following theorem:
Theorem 2. The set of points of an elliptic curve is an abelian group which is either a cyclic group or the product of two cyclic groups.
Let q be a large prime factor of r = #C of multiplicity 1.
-Assume that C is a cyclic abelian group, isomorphic to Z Z/ rZ Z , with generator g ∈ C. The order d of a random G = g α is given by d = r/ gcd(r, α). Therefore q does not divide d if and only if α is a multiple of q. The probability that the order of a random G is not divisible by q is thus 1/q.
-Assume that C is the product of two cyclic abelian groups, then C is isomorphic to some product Z Z/ r 1 Z Z × Z Z/ r 2 Z Z where r 2 divides r 1 and r 1 r 2 = r.
For a large prime factor q of r (with multiplicity 1), q divides r 1 but not r 2 . Therefore q divides the order of an element of the curve if and only if q divides the order of this element with respect to Z Z/ r 1 Z Z . This leads back to the first case, and the probability that the order of a random G is not divisible by q is 1/q again.
In both cases, the probability that a random choice for G yields a small subgroup is negligible.
The New Scheme
The new protocol iterates the signature on a few curves in order to reduce (below an = 2 − /2 ) the probability that all curves will be smooth (figure 4):
System parameters σ random elliptic curves The number of necessary iterations σ is given by:
and is summarized in table 2 for = 160. The slow-down factor γ between the elliptic curve Poupard-Stern signature scheme and the new scheme (signature generation times) is due to the iteration of the signature on σ curves and the increased complexity of point operations over bigger underlying fields. Since the time complexity of elliptic curve scalar multiplication is in O(|p| 3 ), γ is basically given by:
The slow-down factor is summarized in Letting alone the factor γ, the verification times of the new scheme are also slower than usual ECC ones (e.g. ECDSA) because of the additional increase in the size of s due to the Poupard-Stern construction.
Note that Poupard-Stern's security proof will still apply to (at least one of) our curves with probability greater than 1 − ∼ = 1. Surprisingly, instances will be either provably secure against existential forgery under adaptive chosen message attacks (probability greater than 1 − ) or insecure (probability lower than = 2 − /2 ) without transiting through intermediate gray areas where security is only conjectured (our is, of course, not related to [19] 's one).
Although the security proof has not been extended to the case where all curves have the same system parameters (identical p, intersection in G), we conjecture that the resulting scheme (figures 5 and 6) is still secure.
Secret parameters (x i and k i ) must however remain distinct for every curve, given the (deliberately accepted) risk that the DLP might be easy on some of our curves.
It is important to point-out that, due to our probabilistic design, the signer must generate C 1 , . . . , C σ or (at least) make sure that the authority can exhibit a random seed (similar to the DSA's certificate of proper key generation) that yields all the curves' parameters by hashing. 
System parameters
σ elliptic curves C 1 , . . . , C σ intersecting in G a hash function h : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} L Key generation secret: σ random integers x i ∈ R {0, 1} L public: σ points Y i = −x i G such that Y i ∈ C i Signature for i = 1 to σ pick a large random k i compute R i = k i G ∈ C i = (x Ri , y Ri ) compute s i = k i + x i × h(m, x Ri ) signature: {{x R1 , s 1 }, . . . , {x Rσ , s σ }} Verification for i = 1 to σ Compute R i = s i G + h(m, R i )Y i = (x R i , y R i ) Check that x R i ? = x Ri
Extensions and Variants
The scheme can be improved in many ways: by hashing x i = h (x, i) and k i = h (k, i) one can make the economy of σ − 1 secret keys and session randoms; a particularly efficient variant consists in grouping {R 1 , . . . , R σ } in a single digest ( figure 7) ; the scheme can, of course, be implemented on any group. Note that when p is an RSA modulus (hereafter n), life becomes much harder for the attacker who must (in our present state of knowledge) factor n (equivalent to point counting [10] Table 3 . Strengthening factors for = 160 and 1 ≤ σ ≤ 7. The overwhelming security contribution comes from the factorisation of n although when this calculation comes to an end, the attacker may face a (nonsmooth) curve where the DLP is hard. The attacker's success chances are consequently reduced to:
for one curve and
for the σ curves. This indicates an interesting way of squeezing more complexity out of RSA moduli: since (in our present state of knowledge) smooth curves can not be spotted without factoring n, the inverse of represents a strengthening factor that multiplies 1 the attacker's effort by a factor depending on |n| and σ (table 3 for = 160).
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System parameters
αs + β = 0 mod λ(n) and α s + β = 0 mod λ(n)
such that for some polynomial B, which only depends on the machine which presumably performs the existential forgery, GCD(α, α ) ≤ B; from these equations, s can be computed in polynomial time.
In the elliptic curve case, there is no analog to step 2; which requires a further twist:
1. compute a multiple ρ of the (unknown) order r of G, which is approximately |X| + |k|-bit long. 2. use the forking lemma's 3-fork variant to yield a couple of relations involving s:
such that for some polynomial B, which only depends on the machine which presumably performs the existential forgery, GCD(α, α ) ≤ B. Furthermore, we cancel all primes smaller than B from ρ. From these relations and ρ, one can compute a substitute to s which satisfies V = −sG without being in the proper range. 3. Finally, we show that an algorithm which computes a substitute of s and a multiple of r with significant probability can be turned into an algorithm which computes the proper value of s: Lemma 1. An algorithm A which computes with significant probability a fixedsize multiple ρ of the unknown order r of G and a substitute to the secret key s < ρ can be turned into an algorithm B which computes the proper value of s.
Proof. Let be the success probability of A and fix δ = /|ρ|. By induction on |ρ|, we show how to design an algorithm B which discloses the actual key with probability at least δ: Apply A to V = −sG, where s is in the proper range for keys. A could either output s with probability δ (in which case the proof is complete) or it outputs a substitute s = s with probability bigger than (ρ − 1)δ. In this case, we can consider s − s and ρ − s + s; both are multiples of r and one of them (hereafter ρ ) is smaller than ρ/2. Note that A produces, with probability δ|ρ | a multiple ρ of r. Furthermore, it also produces substitute keys smaller than ρ , since one can always replace a substitute s by s mod ρ ; we can thus apply the inductive hypothesis, which completes the proof.
